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1.  Challenges in times of crisis 
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. 
The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. Central banks are 
called upon to focus monetary policy on fighting unemployment and tolerating temporarily 
somewhat higher inflation. This has triggered the question whether the mandate of a central bank 
should not be widened, especially in case employment and/or economic growth are not (yet) 
included in the present institutional arrangement. At the same time, a comparable discussion has 
started on the responsibility of central banks to ensure financial stability. International cooperation, 
or rather coordination, in the sphere of monetary policy has also become an issue. In this context, 
the status of independence of the central bank has been challenged.  
Monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years. When interest rates 
reached the lower bound, central banks started to adopt measures of quantitative easing that last 
until today. In the context of measures of quantitative easing, i.e. buying heavily government (and 
other) bonds, the question of the border between monetary policy and fiscal policy has been raised. 
This is especially relevant for the ECB’s purchases of bonds of countries in trouble. 
While interest rates are historically low and liquidity is ample, growth continues to be weak. To 
counter the economic inertia, central banks have modified their communication strategies by 
introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This has triggered a general debate regarding the 
adequate level of transparency in monetary policy. 
This is not the occasion to deliver a thorough discussion of these important issues (see Issing 2013). 
So, I will concentrate on the main aspects. 
   2 
2.  The zero bound and forward guidance 
Central banks have reacted to the crisis manifold with ad hoc measures. The risk of time 
inconsistency gives a strong warning that pure discretion will lead to uncertainty and volatility. One 
attempt to overcome this situation and to anchor expectations is by the use of forward guidance as a 
policy tool. Bernanke (Jackson Hole, 2012) has explained that this “is not an unconditional promise”, 
but rather, “a statement about the FOMC’s collective judgment regarding the path of policy that is 
likely to prove appropriate, given the Committee’s objectives and its outlook for the economy.” As 
such it is a self-evident statement and therefore meaningless. The Fed went first for a date-based 
forward guidance, (mentioning late 2014 and later mid-2015 as a period of unchanged low interest 
rates), and then moved to an outcome-based forward guidance, tying changes in the interest rates to 
targets for unemployment (6½ per cent) and inflation.  
On 7 August 2013, the new governor of the BoE announced an explicit state-contingent forward 
guidance. In addition, the BoE published a document of 44 pages on “Monetary policy trade-offs and 
forward guidance”. 
However, the fundamental problem of this “new policy” lies in the approach itself. Forward guidance 
suffers from the same sort of time inconsistency it intends to remedy. Saying that the policy rate is 
likely to remain low well into the future does not imply that the central bank, from the perspective of 
a future date and in the face of rising inflation, will have the incentive to follow through on its 
commitment. The reason being that at this moment in the future it will be confronted with all the 
costs associated with keeping the promise while the benefits will have been reaped in the past. 
The credibility of the forward guidance approach suffers severely from the fact that communication 
of the horizon for forward guidance by the Fed has already changed several times. However, this risk 
is imminent to this approach. And the combination of low interest rates and quantitative easing 
makes it almost impossible to assess the monetary policy stance adequately. This applies even more 
for future policy changes. 
Over such an extended period of time it is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of the 
announced monetary policy on the economy. New shocks might hit the economy. The time 
dimension of those developments varies with the type and magnitude of shocks, the prevailing 
financial sentiment, the international environment and many other variables. Is it therefore not 
impossible to set the horizon for monetary policy in advance? Credible forward guidance, and 
thereby the anchoring of public expectations, cannot come from announcing a fixed number for a 
policy rate but from providing a strategy which allows the public a kind of ex-ante understanding of 
policy decisions under varying conditions by the central bank.    3 
Announcing a specific number for the policy instrument, the main interest rate, for an extended 
period of time, might be seen as an unconditional commitment, which carries the risk that any 
change will be interpreted as a surprise, with the potential to cause turbulence in markets and hurt 
the credibility of the central bank. On the other hand, “conditionality” of such an announcement 
might, in the end, give no forward guidance at all. There is even the risk that a kind of implicit 
pessimism about future growth might have an adverse effect. 
A central bank which has adopted a convincing strategy and communicates the reasons for its policy 
decisions appropriately should not need forward guidance. Any message about future policy should 
be included in the corresponding reaction function. Any additional announcement has a high 
potential of creating confusion. 
The ECB has clarified its modalities for forward guidance in the following way (Monthly Bulletin, July 
2013, p. 9): “At the current juncture, forward guidance contributes to the ECB’s pursuit of its 
mandate of maintaining price stability effectively, within the framework and in full respect of its 
strategy.” 
 
3.  An adequate level of transparency 
The adoption of forward guidance as part of central banks’ communication strategies has triggered a 
renewed discussion on the level of transparency in monetary policy. This is anything but surprising as 
elements of forward guidance – clarifying the future path of the interest rate and other policy 
instruments and disclosing information about the central bank’s perception of macroeconomic 
fundamentals in greater detail – seem to signal a maximum degree of transparency.  
Successful communication is one of the greatest challenges for monetary policy. The more 
convincing central banks can explain the reasons for their monetary policy decisions to the public, 
the more effective their monetary policy will be (see Issing 2005).  
Experience has shown, however, how difficult it is to communicate to the public all the information 
relevant to the decision-making process in a way that is not only exhaustive, but also clear and 
comprehensible. Monetary policy decisions are complex and the environment is constantly changing. 
There is uncertainty about prevailing economic conditions and the nature and dimension of 
economic shocks. As a consequence central banks should abstain from communicating any 
unconditional commitments to future policy conditions.   4 
Central banks are confronted with the challenge to address very different target groups including 
academics, the markets, politicians, and the public at large. Monetary policy takes effect via financial 
markets whose agents are directly affected by monetary policy decisions. Misperceptions of 
monetary policy activity can cost them dearly. Consequently, praise and complaints from the markets 
have understandably become permanent companions of monetary policy. Central banks are 
therefore exposed to the temptation of ascribing an importance to market reactions that goes 
beyond their “transmission” interest.  
There is a high risk that forward guidance will maximize this problem. The more detailed the central 
bank distributes information, the higher the risk that “markets” interpret the information in a way 
that is different from the view of the central bank. This will be almost unavoidable if diverging 
opinions of the members of the decision-making body are published. How will the central bank react 
in such a situation? Adjust its own assessment to that of the markets or “disappoint” market 
expectations?  
It is interesting in this context to mention an event which happened at the meeting of the Swedish 
Central Bank’s Executive Board on 1 September 2010.  Lars Svensson, the deputy governor, believed 
that the repo rate path in the main scenario of the bank was unreasonably high and “claimed that if 
the repo rate path in the main scenario is supported by the majority of the board, one must hope 
that it is still not credible und thus will not have very large consequences before it can hopefully be 
corrected at the next monetary policy meeting”. No doubt, this is a very transparent communication. 
But, what consequences should markets take? The logic of a concept of “full transparency” leads to 
an endless process. “Markets” will never be fully satisfied before monetary policy decisions are more 
or less preannounced.  
There is, however, another dimension of the predictability of decisions. In the medium to longer 
term, it becomes a question of consistency between the sum of individual decisions and the longer 
term objectives of monetary policy. If such consistency is achieved, monetary policy is predictable 
and credible in the long term. Reconciling the two different dimensions of predictability is, and will 
remain, one of the main requirements of communication and monetary policy per se. It is hard to see 
how forward guidance can meet this challenge. 
In this context it seems obvious that the central bank cannot, and therefore should not, commit itself 
to objectives which are beyond its competence. There is a high risk  for the credibility and reputation 
of central banks if they accept or even claim responsibility for real variables, like unemployment or 
growth, over which they have no control.   5 
The ECB has been criticized from the beginning as being intransparent by not publishing minutes, 
including votes by individual members. I think this critique is – to put it mildly – unfair. The media has 
presented the Fed as an opposite, exemplary model of transparency, at a time when the praised 
chairman openly – only half jokingly – declared that he must have made a mistake when somebody 
claimed that he understood what he said.  
In contrast to a widely entrenched view, the ECB has no reason to be in the defensive with its 
communication policy. With the press conference of the President and the introductory statement 
immediately after the monetary policy decisions, the ECB has set a standard for real time 
information. The Monthly Bulletin, which is published timely, gives detailed information on the ECB’s 
assessment of the situation. The term “introductory statement” has a clear psychological 
disadvantage compared with the title “minutes” as the latter gives the impression that reading it 
comes close to having participated in the meeting itself. However, this is far from reality. “Minutes” 
are well drafted documents. 
At the FOMC meeting of 27 and 28 January 2004, the discussion on whether the time lag before 
publication of the minutes should be reduced from six to three weeks elicited the following 
objections: “Some members expressed concern, however, that accelerated release of the minutes 
might have the potential to feed back adversely on the deliberations of the Committee and on the 
minutes themselves. The members also emphasized the importance of allowing sufficient time for 
them to review and comment on the minutes and for reconciling differences of opinion among the 
members of a large and geographically dispersed committee.” 
In this respect it is important to bear in mind the very different institutional arrangement for  the ECB 
compared to other central banks: Many critics of the ECB ignore the special character of being a 
central bank of the currency of a large group of sovereign states. The publication of every council 
member’s vote and argumentation could have a significant impact on their contributions, the 
integrity of members’ voting could be compromised. The media and public will tend to connect 
decisions and votes with the national background. Maybe this applies for the executive board 
members only to a limited extent, but certainly this would be an issue for the national central bank 
governors facing pressure if they are regarded as supporting measures that might be reasonable for 
the euro area as a whole, but go against the national interest of their home country. Immense 
economic divergences across the members of the euro area only intensify such pressures. Hence, 
transparency could not only reduce the readiness of people to be fully transparent, but could 
provoke decisions by members of the governing council to turn actually more national.   6 
Finally, a legal aspect should not be ignored. The ESCB Statute says in Art. 10.4: “The proceedings of 
the meetings shall be confidential. The Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its 
deliberations public”. 
 
4.  The status of independence of the central bank 
The discussions of expanding the mandate of the central bank – a request which has strong political 
support in some European countries – and of the heavy purchases of government bonds, have 
triggered a debate on the independence of central banks.  
In the longer run there is no trade-off between price stability and goals like employment or growth, 
and considering that the effects of monetary policy decisions have a rather long time-lag, a single 
mandate – price stability – is the logical consequence. A dual – or even triple etc. – mandate blurs the 
final possibilities and therefore responsibility of the central bank. The government will always give 
priority to fighting unemployment and will implicitly have a bias for short-termism. Under such an 
arrangement, a central bank voluntarily or under political pressure is always tempted to embark on a 
more expansionary monetary policy. 
This is behind the distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” independence (see e.g. Cargill and 
O’Driscoll 2012). If the central bank’s independence status is exposed to strong political opposition, 
giving up independence de facto might be seen as an option to preserve de jure independence. 
However, this would come at the expense of undermining the fundament of independence for the 
central bank. 
The decision to make a central bank independent is a deliberate act of “self-deprivation of power”, 
and by agreeing on such an arrangement, parliament, so to speak, protects itself against itself. By its 
own logic, this transfer of power excludes policies which need political approval. This is needed for all 
decisions with the objective of redistributing wealth. In a democracy, such acts must be subject to 
parliamentary control. It is true that monetary policy unavoidably will have distributional effects. 
However, one of the strongest arguments for price stability is that inflation hurts those most that are 
unable to protect themselves against its consequences – i.e. the weakest members in society.  
In any case, a central bank must abstain from measures which are directed to having distributionary 
effects, like giving cheap credit to special groups and not to others. Redistributive monetary policy is 
a complex concept. A central bank which is embarking on such a course will have to explain, or rather 
justify, its decisions in political fora and cannot refer to “immunity” based on its independence 
status. This is probably even more relevant if a central bank, in its function as bank supervisory   7 
authority, has the task and the power to save or close a bank. This implies that the supervisor, i.e. the 
central bank, will be heavily involved in the actions of fiscal authorities as providers of taxpayer’s 
money, which could result in political pressure jeopardizing the central bank’s independence (de 
Larosière 2009, p. 43). 
Central bank independence is always under threat. From inside (de facto), from outside, in legal 
terms (de jure), and via appointments. The central bank is an institution of and within society. In 
extreme situations, such as in the event of a sovereign default or a total collapse of the financial 
system, the central bank might lose “strategic independence”, which means nothing less than that 
principles of sound monetary policy are put aside. 
It does not come as a surprise that preferences in government, parliament, and the wider public for 
independence might change over time (Goodfriend, 2012, calls it an “elusive promise”). A central 
bank can defend its independence status only to the extent that it delivers on its mandate, 
communicating its policy to the public in a transparent and coherent way – but also by abstaining 
from all measures which imply “de facto” dependence. Beyond that, the status of independence, – 
de jure and de facto – is exposed to changes in preferences of politics and society. “Not even an 
independent central bank can lastingly defend monetary stability against a ‘society of excessive 
demands’ – in other words, every society gets the rate of inflation it deserves and basically wants” 
(Issing 1993, p. 36). However, this is not an argument for the central bank to “surrender”, by giving 
up de facto independence. 
 
5.  The limits of monetary policy 
Some decisions taken by the ECB have triggered a dispute whether those measures are warranted by 
its mandate. I will not enter into the legal case before the German constitutional court, but will 
rather concentrate on the economic (and political) aspects of the OMT program.  
A  group of economists has criticized the “attacks by some economists, politicians and observers”. It 
is certainly downplaying the critique by reference to “some economists”. However, the number of 
supporters or opponents is not relevant. What matters is the validity of the respective arguments.  
And, in that respect, this group of economists puts is rather blunt: “We consider these attacks as 
wrong in substance, misguided in intent and harmful to Europe and the global economy.” Are the 
arguments straightforward and convincing? And, if not, does this verdict not sound arrogant?   8 
1)  “… on the substance, the criticisms are based on a faulty understanding of the 
responsibilities of central banks. In its role as lender of last resort, a central bank must ensure 
that its liquidity reaches all parts of the economy”. 
This seems to me a new or rather strange interpretation of the role of lender of last resort, 
which is usually defined as providing unlimited liquidity to illiquid but solvent banks at a 
penalty rate. It is obvious that OMT is not in line with this definition.  
Leaving terminology aside, to claim that the “OMT program is an essential monetary policy 
element for the ECB to be able to fulfill its primary mandate of achieving price stability’” is 
difficult to understand. And to refer to the actions of the Bundesbank in purchasing financial 
assets – i.e. government bonds in the past – as an act of “lender of last resort” is just wrong. 
However, to claim that the OMT program is, in this regard, “not different from any other 
monetary policy instrument” is confusing. It denies the difference between the purchase of 
government bonds of the sovereign by a national central bank to influencing interest rates 
and fighting the risk of deflation on the one hand and the purchase of government bonds of 
member states of EMU in trouble – and not buying bonds of all member states on the other 
hand. In acting this way, the central bank intentionally exerts distributional effects. As 
already mentioned, measures of this kind must remain in the domain of fiscal policy, on the 
basis of democratic accountability. Denying this and just declaring OMT as a monetary policy 
instrument lacks any logic. 
The confusion is also visible from the fact that the authors put “programs to purchase debt of 
their sovereigns (!)” on an equal footing with selective purchases of bonds of member states 
in difficulties. 
2)  What is in the best interest of Europe (and Germany) cannot be just explained by the success 
of the sheer announcement of the OMT program. If this is a measure which transgresses the 
border between monetary and fiscal policy, then the announcement as such is endangering 
the reputation of the central bank, indicating that – if needed – it would undertake 
inappropriate measures. In fact, once the ECB will start this program, it will become a 
prisoner of politics and markets. “Of politics” because the central bank will have to rely on 
the conditionality defined by politics. Could one imagine that the ECB would say no because 
labor market reforms highly praised by “Brussels” do not meet any reasonable standard? The 
ECB turns into a prisoner “of markets” because it is hard to expect that the ECB would 
consider suspending interventions if conditionality is not fulfilled. The foreseeable turmoil in 
markets would deliver a strong argument not to withdraw from interventions.    9 
 
3)  The “attacks” are declared as “harmful because they risk weakening the ECB’s ability to carry 
out its role of lender of last resort, thereby risking a deepening of the European crisis and an 
even more severe spillover to the global economy”. Again, referring to the role of lender of 
last resort is misguided. And warning “that any attempt to limit the independence and 
flexibility of the ECB to pursue its mandate, risks a deepening of the European crisis, and risks 
a wider global crisis”, reveals a basic flaw in the statement. Nobody from outside can limit 
the independence of the ECB. It is protected at the constitutional level. But, independence of 
a central bank has limits within its statute. The independence of the central bank is 
constrained to conduct a monetary policy to primarily maintain price stability. The argument 
that the OMT program is just an element of such a policy is wrong. But, if the effect on “price 
stability” would justify any measures one could also argue logically that implementing price 
controls should also be open to decisions by the central bank. And bringing “independence 
and flexibility” to the same level indicates a peculiar misunderstanding of the appropriate 
role of the central bank and its reputation.  
 
If the statement of the group is interpreted as just a kind of political manifesto, the debate 
has to be conducted with political arguments like: What is the nature of the crisis, how 
should responsibilities be allocated between different authorities, and what will or should be 
the “finalité” of European integration? 
 
If the statement is based on economic arguments, it is hard to understand why the authors 
are so convinced that they are absolutely right and “the others” lack any economic sense. 
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